However, the formation was too close to the weather wall to climb from 10,000 ft., an for three confusing minutes they headed straight and level toward the enormous mass. "The navigator B-29's first advised group leaders (Thomas, 15 th Chapin, 21 s and Scandrett, 506 th ) that they would begin a climb over the weather in five minutes. Lambert, the author of the Pineapple Air Force, is quoted here. 370 Miles from Iwo a well-formed weather front was visible for all to see with cumulonimbus soaring to 30,000 ft. If the weather was good, the radio message was "Oranges are sweet" if bad, the reverse, "Oranges are sour". "Soupspoon" was the word for visibility "Quilt" was to indicate the altitude of the clouds. "Quiet" report was the term for weather report "Angels" meant altitude. (the B-29's were a necessity for navigation over water as fighter aircraft did not have the necessary instruments to do it) A radio report had been worked out to chat about the weather on a special frequency. All three P-51 groups had been assembled for the first time to escort a huge force of B-29s on an incendiary raid to Osaka. And so it was on 1 June 1945 that the Seventh Fighter Command sent their mightiest strike force yet against the weather. The air offensive against Japan could not be deferred. The madness inherent in sending massed formations of planes into such unstable conditions was negated by strategic necessity. Despite these efforts, predicting the weather several hours in advance over such an enormous mass of water was little more than scientific conjecture. To augment the job of forecasting, B-24s were sent out on daily weather reconnaisance missions to the Empire. These monumental fronts had become the primary nemesis of the Seventh Fighter Command and the Twenty-First Bomber Command. They were south of the Volcano Islands during the invasion and the early weeeks of Iwo's occupation, but moved north over the Nanpo Shoto through May and June. Migratory high pressure systems off the Asiatic continent mingled with Pacific highs in lines of convergence that formed severe weather fronts.
The region was a sort of meteorlogical stewpot. This casual observation bore an element of truth. Pilots stationed on Iwo Jima were prone to claim that if there was a cloud anywhere in the Pacific it would be hanging around Iwo. The first planes landed shortly before 1300 and the reports they brought back were not at all encouraging. The predicted weather front had been encountered en route. Around noon, reports began filtering through from Agate Base, via North Field Operations, that the mission was turning around coming home. Two and a half hours later the long range preliminary report phoned to A-2 at the Fighter Command indicated that 51 of our aircraft were still airborne. Delayed 45 minutes because of ground fog at the other airfields, ( 2) takeoff of the 59 aircraft of the 506 th was accomplished at 0757. Included in the Air Sea Rescue facilities were 5 subs, 4 superdumbos, 5 dumbos, and 2 surface vessels. It was estimated (by annex "A", Intelligence) that not more than 200 fighters were available for the defense of the Osaka area and that pilot shortages, gasoline shortages, and maintenance difficulties would ground about half of the Nip effectives.
The 506 th was to be lead escort for the bomber stream. 148 P-51's of the 506th, in conjunction with the 15th and 21st Fighter Groups to support a maximum effort bombing raid by the XXI Bomber Command against Osaka ( MAP) on 31 May, the date being later extended to 1 June. FC Field order called for the 506 th to escort 400 B-29 over.